India and France Deepen Ties—But Washington Still Matters

At first glance, France and India don’t look like natural bed‑fellows. One sits comfortably within NATO, the other has long steered clear of formal alliances. France carries the legacy of a sprawling colonial empire, while India was the prized jewel of the British Crown. Still, both countries see themselves as independent poles in an increasingly multipolar world.

France’s president, Emmanuel Macron, loves to talk about “strategic autonomy.” It’s a fancy way of saying Paris wants to keep its own nuclear deterrent separate from NATO’s command structure. In fact, France refuses to join NATO’s nuclear planning group, insisting on a stand‑alone force that can also extend a protective umbrella to other European states.

India, for its part, is also a nuclear power that prizes an autonomous security policy. After the Cold War, New Delhi never signed any defence pact, even though it bought a lot of Soviet‑era equipment and still imports Russian oil. The country’s non‑aligned roots still matter, and that tradition of “no‑strings‑attached” cooperation shapes its approach to friends like France.

What really shifted the relationship between Paris and New Delhi was the year 1998. India detonated a series of nuclear tests, prompting Washington to slap sanctions on the subcontinent. France, however, refused to follow suit and instead upgraded its strategic partnership with India that same year. That moment, subtle as it may have seemed then, laid the groundwork for a friendship that has grown steadily ever since.

Since the turn of the millennium, the two nations have been busy building bridges—both literal and figurative. They have held regular naval drills (starting in 2001), air‑force exercises (since 2003), and army maneuvers (since 2011). India even took part in France’s multinational Orion exercises, learning to work side‑by‑side with European forces.

On the hardware front, France has become a go‑to supplier for New Delhi’s armed forces. Remember the 2016 deal for 36 Rafale jets? That was just the beginning. By 2025 India ordered 26 carrier‑capable Rafale‑M fighters, and a year later another 114 Rafales were on the books. Submarine‑wise, India bought the design for six Scorpène boats back in 2005 and has recently placed an order for three more, all built under a joint venture in Indian shipyards.

Last year, the French Directorate General of Armaments and India’s Defense Research and Development Organisation signed a sweeping agreement that covers everything from unmanned vehicles and AI‑driven cyber security to advanced materials and underwater tech. The deal builds on a longer‑term plan titled “Horizon 2047,” a roadmap that looks a decade ahead to keep the partnership cutting‑edge.

Most recently, after a series of high‑profile visits—Macron to New Delhi and Modi to Paris—both governments opened talks about India joining France’s Future Combat Air System, a program aimed at creating a sixth‑generation fighter. If that pans out, we could see Indian pilots flying aircraft that are still in the conceptual stage today.

All of this sounds promising, but it’s worth noting that both France and India have been a little uneasy about Washington lately. France, as a leading EU member, feels the sting of American tariffs that target European products—wine, cheese, you name it. Back in June, former President Trump even threatened a 100 % tariff on French wine unless Paris dropped its digital services tax on U.S. tech firms.

India, too, worries about U.S. trade moves. In early September, the Senate passed the Lindsey Graham‑named sanctioning act that would slap a full tariff on the top five importers of Russian oil—a list that includes India. The bill is stuck in the House now, but the possibility of a near‑term tariff hangs over New Delhi’s head.

Beyond economics, both nations have recent diplomatic grievances. France lost its bid to sell Barracuda submarines to Australia after the AUKUS pact—essentially a British‑American solution—went ahead. India, meanwhile, is skeptical of Washington’s reliance on Pakistan as a go‑between in its on‑and‑off talks with Iran, a dynamic that New Delhi finds unsettling given its own fraught relationship with Islamabad.

What we are seeing, then, is not so much a grand pivot away from the United States as a pragmatic hedging strategy. Paris and New Delhi are both looking to diversify their security and economic options, just as many Middle‑Eastern states have done in recent years. That said, the diversification should complement, not replace, the U.S. deterrent and partnership.

India’s rise as a regional heavyweight in Asia means it will inevitably have to work alongside Washington to contain a more assertive China. The French‑Indian partnership can certainly add depth—think of a broader coalition of like‑minded powers—but it shouldn’t be built on a loss of confidence in American reliability.

In short, the flourishing Franco‑Indian bond is a good thing, but it must remain a piece of a larger puzzle that still includes a robust trans‑Atlantic relationship. Otherwise, the United States risks watching two of its most valuable partners drift into a corner where Washington’s influence wanes.