The Unused Ace: CDS Gen Anil Chauhan Reflects on Air Power and 1962 War's Missed Opportunities

India's Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Anil Chauhan recently offered a compelling re-evaluation of the 1962 Sino-Indian War, asserting that a strategic deployment of air power could have profoundly altered its outcome. Speaking at the insightful 'Valiant Parakram' seminar, General Chauhan didn't shy away from critiquing the historical decisions that shaped one of India's most challenging military engagements, particularly highlighting the 'Forward Policy' as a fundamental misstep in crucial regions like Ladakh and NEFA.

General Chauhan's analysis centered on a pivotal 'what if' moment in Indian military history: the non-utilization of the Indian Air Force (IAF) during the conflict.

He emphasized that in 1962, the IAF was far from a nascent force; it was a well-equipped and highly capable air arm, boasting formidable aircraft such as Canberra bombers, Hunter and Mystere fighter-bombers, Gnat interceptors, and Vampire jets. Furthermore, it possessed substantial strategic and tactical airlift capabilities with aircraft like the AN-12 and C-119s, perfectly poised to support ground operations and logistical needs.

The IAF, he pointed out, was not only ready for action but also well-trained, with its aircrew eager to engage.

The decision to keep the IAF grounded, General Chauhan revealed, was purely political. It stemmed from a profound, albeit perhaps misplaced, fear that Chinese air retaliation would devastate major Indian cities like Calcutta and Delhi.

This apprehension persisted despite credible intelligence suggesting China lacked the long-range air assets necessary to pose such a significant threat at the time. This strategic paralysis, born out of an overestimation of enemy capabilities and an underestimation of one's own, proved costly.

The CDS echoed the sentiments of several military historians and strategists, including American scholar George Tanham from the RAND Corporation, who had previously identified India's reluctance to employ air power as a critical strategic blunder.

By not deploying the IAF, India effectively granted the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) unfettered freedom of movement, allowing them to concentrate their ground forces without the constant threat of aerial interdiction or logistical disruption. This unchallenged dominance in the air space significantly handicapped Indian ground forces, who were already battling formidable terrain and logistical challenges.

Drawing lessons from this historical oversight, General Chauhan underscored the imperative of integrated warfare in the contemporary global landscape.

Modern conflicts, he argued, can no longer be fought in silos. They demand a seamless synergy across all domains – land, air, sea, space, and cyber. The comprehensive application of national power, with integrated tri-service operations and robust strategic thinking, is paramount. The 1962 war serves as a stark reminder of the critical importance of a clear and decisive political-military interface, ensuring that national security decisions are made with a full understanding of both capabilities and consequences, and without allowing unfounded fears to dictate strategic choices.