The River of Regret: Nadda Rips Into Nehru's 'Himalayan Blunder' on Indus Waters

In a scathing critique that reverberated through the political landscape, BJP President JP Nadda recently cast a piercing spotlight on a pivotal moment in India's post-independence history: the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty. Nadda didn't mince words, unequivocally branding former Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's decision to sign this agreement as a "Himalayan blunder," a monumental error that, he asserts, irrevocably compromised the nation's strategic interests.

The Indus Waters Treaty, brokered by the World Bank, carved up the vital river system flowing through India and Pakistan.

While it allocated the eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) to India, it ceded control over the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) – rivers that originate within India's borders – primarily to Pakistan. This fundamental allocation, Nadda argues, was not merely an act of diplomacy but a profound strategic miscalculation, gifting Pakistan an indispensable advantage in water security at India's expense.

The 'compromise of national interest,' as articulated by Nadda, stems from several critical vantage points.

Firstly, it curtailed India's rightful leverage over a shared natural resource. By relinquishing significant control over the western rivers, India arguably surrendered a potent strategic tool that could have been vital in future bilateral negotiations. Secondly, it raised enduring questions about India's long-term water security, particularly in regions dependent on these westward-flowing rivers.

Critics contend that the treaty, in its eagerness for a quick resolution, failed to adequately safeguard India's future needs and strategic options.

While proponents of the treaty often highlight its role in preventing water wars and fostering a semblance of stability between two often-antagonistic neighbours, Nadda's renewed assault suggests a deeper, unaddressed wound.

He implies that the benevolent spirit underlying Nehru's decision might have overshadowed a pragmatic assessment of geopolitical realities and the perennial nature of Pakistan's antagonism. The question he raises is whether India, in its pursuit of peace, paid too high a price, one that continues to affect its strategic posture decades later.

Nadda's strong condemnation serves as a potent reminder of how historical decisions continue to shape contemporary debates and national policies.

For the BJP, this 'Himalayan blunder' isn't merely a point of academic discussion but a living testament to what they perceive as foundational errors in India's initial foreign policy framework. It's a narrative that seeks to re-evaluate past compromises and underscore the imperative of prioritizing national interest above all, even when it comes to the flow of shared rivers.