The Enduring Embrace: How American Presidents Empowered Pakistan's Strongmen

For decades, a curious and often contradictory dynamic has defined the relationship between the United States and Pakistan. While American rhetoric frequently champions democracy and self-determination, its actions, particularly concerning Pakistan, have painted a different picture: one of consistent support for military strongmen, often at the expense of nascent democratic institutions.

This pattern, deeply rooted in geopolitical strategy, has profoundly shaped Pakistan's political landscape and continues to echo in its present.

The story begins in the Cold War era. As the U.S. sought allies against the spread of communism, Pakistan, strategically located and eager for foreign aid, presented itself as a willing partner.

This alignment laid the groundwork for a peculiar alliance: American presidents, from Eisenhower onwards, found it expedient to back Pakistan's powerful military leaders, even when they overthrew civilian governments. Field Marshal Ayub Khan, who seized power in 1958, quickly became a favored figure, seen as a bulwark against communism and a reliable regional anchor.

The U.S. poured aid into Pakistan, solidifying the military's power and influence, often overshadowing its civilian counterparts.

This transactional relationship endured through subsequent decades. During the tumultuous period of the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War, President Richard Nixon famously sided with General Yahya Khan, Pakistan's military dictator, largely to leverage Pakistan's connection to China in a bid to open relations with Beijing.

This decision, widely criticized for its moral implications, underscored the U.S. preference for strategic convenience over democratic principles, even when facing humanitarian crises.

The pattern resurfaced with formidable clarity during the Soviet-Afghan War. General Zia-ul-Haq, who orchestrated a coup in 1977 and ruled with an iron fist, became an indispensable ally for President Ronald Reagan's administration.

Pakistan's role as a frontline state against Soviet expansion in Afghanistan meant that Zia's authoritarian rule was largely overlooked, if not actively tacitly supported, by Washington. Billions in aid flowed, strengthening Zia's grip on power and enabling him to pursue an Islamization program that had long-term, complex consequences for Pakistan's society.

The most recent chapter in this narrative unfolded in the aftermath of 9/11.

General Pervez Musharraf, who had overthrown an elected government in 1999, quickly became a crucial ally in President George W. Bush's 'War on Terror.' Despite his non-democratic ascent to power, Musharraf was hailed as a key partner, receiving substantial military and economic assistance. The U.S.

once again prioritized immediate security interests, effectively legitimizing military rule and delaying Pakistan's return to robust civilian governance.

Critics argue that this recurring American policy has inadvertently stifled the growth of stable democratic institutions in Pakistan. By consistently empowering military leaders, the U.S.

has arguably signaled that military coups can be rewarded, rather than condemned. This has fostered a cycle where the military perceives itself as the ultimate arbiter of national destiny, often intervening in politics when it deems civilian leadership to be faltering or threatening its interests.

The consequences of this enduring embrace are multifaceted.

While providing short-term strategic advantages, it has arguably undermined long-term stability and democratic development in Pakistan. It has also created a complex legacy for US-Pakistan relations, where mutual trust is often overshadowed by transactional pragmatism and a deep-seated skepticism about American intentions among the Pakistani populace.

As Pakistan grapples with its democratic future, the shadow of these historical alliances continues to loom large, a testament to the complex interplay of power, politics, and paradoxical foreign policy.