The Aadhaar Database Needs a Spring Clean, Says Telecom Advisor
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- February 13, 2026
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Untraceable SIMs and 'Ghost Numbers': Why COAI is Urging a Major Aadhaar Database Cleanup for National Security
A top advisor from the Cellular Operators Association of India (COAI) is sounding the alarm, calling for an urgent and regular cleanup of the Aadhaar database. The concern? A significant number of SIM cards are linked to untraceable individuals, creating a national security risk and hindering law enforcement.
It seems our digital identity system, Aadhaar, while incredibly useful, might be a little cluttered behind the scenes. Rajan S. Mathews, a key advisor to the Director General of the Cellular Operators Association of India (COAI), has recently voiced a rather pressing concern: the Aadhaar database, specifically concerning its links to telecom services, is in dire need of a thorough cleanup. And honestly, when you hear the details, it makes a lot of sense.
Mathews isn't just idly speculating; he’s pointing to a genuinely worrying trend. Picture this: a significant chunk – we're talking perhaps 20% to 30% – of the SIM cards currently linked to Aadhaar might belong to individuals who are, for all practical purposes, untraceable. These aren't just inactive numbers; they're numbers linked to people who have, say, moved away, often migrant laborers who obtained a SIM with their Aadhaar in one state and then simply vanished from that location without a trace. This creates what many are calling 'ghost numbers' or, even more unsettling, 'disposable SIMs'.
Think about it for a moment. This isn't just an administrative headache for telecom operators. It's a deeply concerning loophole that carries serious national security implications. Imagine a SIM card used for illegal activities – cybercrimes, drug trafficking, or even worse, acts of terrorism. If that SIM is linked to an Aadhaar number, but the actual person behind it cannot be found, it makes prosecution incredibly difficult, almost impossible, sometimes. The trail simply goes cold, leaving law enforcement scratching their heads and criminals free to operate.
Mathews' call to action is clear: we need a systematic, periodic cleansing of this database. He's suggesting that perhaps every two or three years, a rigorous process should be undertaken to identify and deactivate these untraceable connections. Furthermore, he emphasizes the critical importance of maintaining the integrity of the Aadhaar system itself, particularly when it comes to linking new SIM cards. Biometric verification and concrete address proof should be non-negotiable requirements, ensuring that each new connection genuinely adheres to the 'one person, one identity' principle.
After all, the original intent of Aadhaar was to provide a robust, unique identity. If a substantial portion of the identities linked to active services like mobile numbers becomes nebulous, the very foundation of that security begins to crack. This isn't about blaming anyone; it's about acknowledging a growing problem and proactively seeking a solution. A cleaner, more accurate Aadhaar-linked telecom database isn't just good for operators; it's absolutely vital for the safety and security of the entire nation. It’s high time we dusted off the digital shelves and made sure everything is exactly where it should be.
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