Saudi Arabia Under Houthi Fire – Why Pakistan Holds Back Despite the Mecca Defence Pact

When rockets from Yemen slammed into Saudi Arabia’s southern oil and utility installations on Tuesday, the scene was chaotic – flames leapt, smoke billowed and over 70 people ended up in hospitals. The attacks, part of a growing wave of Houthi aggression, have once again thrown the kingdom into the global spotlight.

What makes this flare‑up even more interesting, however, is the backdrop of a defence agreement signed in August in the holy city of Mecca. The three‑signatory pact – Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey – declares that an attack on any one of them will be considered an attack on all. At first glance it sounds a lot like NATO’s Article 5, doesn’t it?

But dig a little deeper and you’ll see the wording is far less concrete. The communiqué never spelled out exactly what each country must do when the clause is triggered. No clear numbers of troops, no defined air‑defence obligations – just a broad, almost poetic, promise of solidarity. A Turkish official even stressed that the pact is “purely defensive” and does not overrule existing bilateral accords with other nations.

That vagueness gives Islamabad a lot of breathing room. Unlike NATO, where Article 5 automatically drags every member into a military response, Pakistan can decide how far it wants to go – whether that means sending a squadron of jets, dispatching more troops, or simply offering intelligence and training.

In fact, Pakistan is already helping Saudi Arabia in a more subtle way. Roughly 8,000 Pakistani soldiers, along with fighter jets, drones and an air‑defence system, are stationed in the kingdom. For years, Pakistani officers have trained Saudi forces and shared technical know‑how. Under the new Mecca pact, Islamabad could crank up that support – more radar coverage, extra pilots, extra advice – without putting boots on the ground in Yemen.

Why the caution? Apart from the obvious cost of a deeper military adventure, Pakistan is juggling its own economic woes and a delicate diplomatic balancing act with Iran, its neighbour. Riyadh is a close ally, sure, but Islamabad cannot afford to alienate Tehran, especially as it tries to play a quiet mediator between the United States and Iran.

Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has condemned the Houthi attacks, signalling that Pakistan does not want to appear indifferent. Yet officials have been quick to stress that nuclear weapons are “not on the radar” when it comes to defending Saudi Arabia – a reminder that the 2025 Saudi‑Pakistan security deal was never meant to turn Pakistan into a nuclear shield for Riyadh.

Analysts such as Michael Kugelman of the Atlantic Council note that the Mecca pact is significant, but it is not a full‑blown regional bloc. It is a flexible arrangement, leaving room for political calculations, economic realities and the ever‑present fear of being sucked into a broader Middle‑East conflagration.

So, when the Houthi rockets fell, Pakistan chose a measured response: continue its existing support, voice diplomatic disapproval, and keep the big‑gun options on the shelf. The test now is whether the three‑way agreement can survive another round of strikes without being forced into a clearer, perhaps riskier, military commitment.

For Islamabad, the tightrope walk is clear – prove that the Mecca pact is more than a piece of paper, but avoid a direct plunge into a conflict that could quickly spiral beyond its control.