It is Unlikely That the ISIS Attack on Iran Will Escalate Conflict in West Asia

The latest conflagration in the West Asia North Africa (WANA) region occurred on 3 January this year when two blasts targeted ceremonies being held in the Kerman province to mark the death anniversary of Iran's top military leader General Qassem Suleimani, assassinated four years ago by US forces in Iraq.

The symbolism of the attack, believed to be the deadliest on Iranian territory since the 1979 revolution which 103 killed and injured 141, cannot be lost. Also Read IS Claims Responsibility for Blasts Near Iran General's Grave That Killed 100 ADVERTISEMENT REMOVE AD Fears of Escalation Iran is no stranger to terror attacks on its soil, but these have usually been targeted assassinations, like that of nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh in 2020, rather than such mass killings.

Iran has usually pinned the blame for these on the "Zionist entity" Israel. Interestingly, with the Gaza war raging between Israel and Iran backed militant group Hamas, Iran did not, following the blasts, rush to blame anyone. Moreover, the Kerman attacks came a day after Israel assassinated Hamas leader Saleh Al Arouri in Lebanon.

The Kerman attacks, however, coupled with Al Arouri's assassination, have sparked fears of an escalation of the conflict. The Red Sea is also already witnessing an episode of violence that has disrupted international shipping and supply chains, and increased prices of commodities. Egypt has already frozen the talks it was supposed to host between Israel and Hamas following the assassination.

US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken has embarked on yet another tour of the region, where his shuttle diplomacy since October 2023 has yet to yield a ceasefire or get Israel to scale down its attacks on Gaza, or the return of all Israeli hostages from Hamas' captivity. Also Read The Cauldron of Gaza War and Houthis on India’s Infrastructural Push Via Eurasia ADVERTISEMENT REMOVE AD Iran's Proxies Yet, if the past is any indication, it is doubtful that Iran will take any direct retaliatory action.

Neither the assassination of Suleimani by the US nor of Fakhrizadeh inside Iran (alleged by the Iranians to be a Mossad operation) elicited any direct action from Iran. The Iran Iraq war of the 1980s remains the last instance where the former actively participated in conflict. Since then, it has embarked on a policy of cultivating its Shiite proxy militias across the region to advance its influence politically and outsource its wars without embroiling itself in direct conflict with its adversaries.

These are Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas, the only Sunni force that it supports and through whom it has been participating in a shadow war with Israel for decades. In Yemen, Tehran has its Houthi proxies, which, took on the its other rivals in the region, that is, the Saudi Emirati coalition backing the government of President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi.

The Houthies are now targeting Israel bound ships in the Red Sea since the breakout of the Gaza war. In Iraq, it used the Hashd al Sha'bi militias to fight ISIS and the US forces, as well as assert its influence in domestic Iraqi politics. Hezbollah and limited Iranian military support also came to the aid of the Iran backed regime of President Bashar Al Assad when civil war broke out in Syria.

Together with Russia, it saved the day for Assad. Iran's Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian had, in the initial days of the war, warned that if Israel did not cease its attacks on the Gaza Strip, "new fronts will be opened". Following this, Lebanon based Hezbollah launched rockets on Israel's northern border inviting retaliation from the IDF.

Now, following the assassination of Al Arrouri, Hezbollah chief Hasan Nasrallah has vowed revenge. Rhetoric aside, Lebanon is not prepared, at least economically, for another war. With Iran still under Western sanctions and given its stretched resources, Hezbollah may, therefore, not escalate the conflict.

China has been calling for an end to attacks in the Red Sea as its supply chains are affected, and it sees it as another pretext for a Western naval presence there. As Iran's major ally and largest buyer of Iranian crude, it may prevail on it to rein in the Houthis. More stepped up attacks on US forces by Iran backed militant groups in Iraq and northern Syria might be an alternate option for Tehran.

Also Read A Cautionary Note on India Dispatching Warships to Counter Houthi Attacks ADVERTISEMENT REMOVE AD What It Means for Gaza and Other Arab Nations On the other hand, the Arab states have not shown any particular resolve to end the conflict. True, they have taken some diplomatic measures. For instance, Saudi Arabia convened a summit of Arab and Muslim states, the UAE got a resolution for humanitarian aid to Gaza endorsed by the UN Security Council, Qatar has facilitated the release of many Israeli hostages from Hamas and Palestinian prisoners from Israeli custody, Egypt and Jordan have facilitated diplomatic summits.

Egypt has even facilitated the transfer of humanitarian aid to Gaza and the transfer of patients and the wounded from there to hospitals in the Arab world. Nonetheless, no country has any appetite for hordes of Palestinian immigrants or a strong or victorious Hamas or any other militant group. With the Western world demonstrating no political will for a ceasefire, it is really up to Israel to decide when to stop.

In this regard, it may have been better had Egypt gone ahead with the planned Israel Hamas meeting instead of calling them off in the wake of Al Arrouri's assassination. Blinken's visit may yet resuscitate that, as with the US administration entering an election year, there is little appetite for any further escalation of the conflict.

What is apparent in all of this is the diminishing US influence there, as Arab countries watch with trepidation the spectre of Iranian influence rising anew. While they brook no tolerance for militant groups like Hamas, thousands of dead Palestinian civilians make for bad optics and the inability to have a ceasefire three months on shows their own lack of power.

This, in turn, is paving the way for closer cooperation between the Arab world with Russia and China, which is inevitable with the induction of countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE into BRICS. Finally, the Kerman attacks should be a waking call for India, with a resurgent ISIS in the neighborhood, active not just in Iran, but also of late, in Pakistan.

(Aditi Bhaduri is a journalist and political analyst. She tweets @aditijan. This is an opinion piece. The views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.) Also Read Israel Hamas War: The Likely Geopolitical Turbulence in the Middle East ( At The Quint, we are answerable only to our audience.

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